updatedpropcalculusongod2 Thetamatheia Enaria, quippe ab enariis i.e. simiis, nomen nacta, in quas Cercopes mutati finguntur,* for Ilacuris, quod Moletius Caros de lost infantes dici teflatur,* for we our our own little forest monkeys, bourne into a flesh worn down before it's organs hath begun to occupy as scheduled participations as we had, for in relation to our minds, every resilient, and ever virile, our bodies hadst been too improperly made, or in comparison to it's garment our mind is, Hygea, indignus vindice nodus, an unworthy and yet talented vindication of such a disparity, it claimeth for itself every moment and exists as the moment, and, not resisting the possibilities of an eternal existence, it considereth not of the in dividable existence of every moment; every Moment is an organization of all the moments that came before it, for Time is dividable, or is at least a continuity in temporal magnitude, and so that every moment may be figured into eternity, and must bear within it's substance an in dividable unit, or the in finitely dividable unit, such that this is the moment, and cannot wherewith be divided, or wherewith can be divided eternally, the moment of the entire world, hangs in every other, so the Soul is that which can contemplate the partitions of the world, in the moment, that is called time, wherewith every moment is conserved before it. Time may end such that a final moment exists but it cannot be destroyed. As every moments avoids to be diffused in time so the Soul of a Man and those things with which his Soul was fascinated by and, indeed, even such an opulence as feelings themselves, will all be conserved in the moments of our lives that cannot be induced to anything more thenmoments. If time hath a temporal magnitude and is not the whole of indivisable nows, as Aristotle affirmeth, then it is a continuity, or otherwise infinitly divisable, such that all creation, either past or future, is a part of a similar continuity called time, such that, any part in time can be stretched across eternity. Zeno in his Paradox of Place is rectified by the fact that if a world were to exist without place it would become a continuity as time is without momentary elements to itself, such that, any part in the world is infinitely divisible, or concieved of infintely divisible parts, and every place in the world is a part of every other place as a place, being the temporal origination of definite forms in the world, can be exemplified in such a way as to filleth up an unimaginable time, so is the initial moment of creation stretched into the final, and so is every origination of the parts of the world stretched into the final degeneration of these parts. The panta rhei and the immovable world of Paremnides are but general terms for a world that is not so various, for in either world, we find that no state of being, either previous to, or in succession of, is more veritable, or posseseth more of a say in the whole of creation then any other, for if a thing is in constant change it is never one thing, if something is in constant change it hath never been a single and defined form, therein, all it's particular states are as equally objective to it's existence, and in the mind of Parmenides, nothing can be moved, as is in the world of Heraclitus, as in his constantly changing world no "world" may be discerned, such that every change is inexaustable, and every change uneffected by the next, such that anything that is changes, and that changes, such that anything that is in constant change never changes, that which is changed never was, for it is always changing, and thereof, cannot be changed, so that creation must be a continuity of change, each change as appelative to the whole as the next. So a Man is a terrible creature to contemplate the nature of eternity when the nature of that which cannot be divided is all so apparent and concerneth him more immediately as it goes that he livest in these moments, such beautiful, and truly perfect, and elemental. As Heraclitus sayes, that all is in a fire, that is a constancy of it's own motivation, and that all is in a period of change, so is nothing in a period of change, as that which is always changing is present in no single state, and thereof, as the indivisible continuity, exists as a single investure of many states, whereby each of it's state stand an equally veritable end to this investure as any other. But e'en I would beg to contemplate the nature of eternity as it is corresponded with the existence of a God, for this is not greedy, or an ignominious pursuit, or vain intellectualism, and God must be that moment which all other moments pursue, and those moments must recede into themselves such that they may never be absorbed again, and keep to themselves, as their own solitary Heavens. Time is that application of the Soul to the investigation of individual partitions of moments within what is ultimately God's moment; that can be either stretched into eternity or constitute time in an inclusion of changes brought about by their parts, as an invention, Eucontheus, stelae cujusdam, sepulchralis, Salamine,* or wherewith Time ends, and the final moment is so revealed as the sum of all the moments before it, the recognition of elements of time within time, such that all that happens is never really lost, and will be amongst the final calculations of the universe conduced to a residence behind all the other of the World's forms, such that any thing; literature, romance, philosophy, that hath filled our moments, will forever be a part of that indivisable moment, as a procession of Cercopes behind the circus of all of time. 1. Hereof we assume; that which can be divided must ultimately be originated by parts that are not dividable, or are infinitely dividable, and thereof unadulterable and indiffusable, for the whole is an [inclusion of changes] brought about by it's parts, any whole being a sort of invention of change taken on by the assumption of it's various parts, such that every change effected by it's parts is a presupposition to the whole of those parts, and thereof that this whole must either be divisable or infinitely divisable, for in either circumstance, we find that the necessity to the whole being able to be divided into either a part or into a part into another part, such that each other part is beyond degeneration, as it may be factored into eternity, is met with. Neither can the past cease to be, but rather, does it factor itself into eternity, for it is infinitely dividable, and thereof, cannot be divided into the point wherein enough of the past is not left to constitute the past, such that the element is every nondividable part of a whole, or infinitely dividable part in a whole, that the world maketh up only the world, and thereof that it is precipitated by parts, either dividable or infinitely dividable, that, in either circumstance, art conservatory and indefatigable. For as the world is all the orders of elements, which are it's parts, as it is a final whole, of these parts, and time, which is the continual reorganization of the orders of elements in the world, which are the parts of the world, so that some parts of the world, which art orders of elements, may generate and some degenerate, is dividable or infintely dividable, so that because time is a whole of some parts, a moment exists as an immortal and pure unit of time, or an element in time, that conserves a temporary existence of all the possible orders of elements, which are the parts of the world, in time, at that moment, as that moment mayst be factored across eternity, in either case of nondividability or infinite dividability, as that only the world is finally dividable, for it is the final whole of some parts, as it maketh nothing itself, and neither does time constitute anything but time, so is it constituted by these moments which may either be dividable or infinitely dividable. 2. So the world is separate from the Elements that it is created from; it is derived as a circumstance of the orders of the elements(Heraclitus, all is fire) for the elements must remain elemental at all times and the world is not elemental, it is dividable, so that it is a whole of some parts, and, rather or not it's parts are infintely dividable into other parts, the world is certainly derived from parts, or units, as the smallest portions of the world, which may be elements, may or may not be factored infinitely, art certainly factored, whilst the world does not itself factor into another thing, save, of course, the One Order; see 13. So is the world derived from these parts which are more pure then itself; which is a final creation, and cannot be factored into anything, or it is the final whole, for the world is not a part of another world if it is the world[entirety of elements in order except for the transcendental order; see13.] B. An order of elements is an order of either non dividable or infinitely devidable parts to the world which is a final whole, or distribution, of those parts, or of moments in time, time being the final distribution of those moments, being dividable, into a unit that it, itself, may either be divided eternally into: so that the whole is an inclusion of changes brought about by it's parts, as in 1. (Elemental order; part of the whole of the world as a final distribution of those parts that can be either dividable or infinitely dividable for the world as the final distribution of these parts cannot be factored into anything else within it's definition as all the orders of elements which are parts of the whole of the world as a final distribution of those parts and may only be factored into the ultimately conservative order, see 13, which lyeth outside it's definition as the world.) (Every element in the world is in an order so that every order of elements, which is every element, must be either dividable or infintely dividable)(Something that is made of parts that are indivisable[the world] is as good as made of ones that art not for an infinitely divisable element may not ever be factored into non existence and an infinitely divisable part in time can be stretched into it's own eternity. 3 The world or a worldly thing is the circumstance of elements in a particular order or can be nominated as that which is the order of all elements, any effect that is undergone by a worldly thing is an effect going on within the world, such that time and shape, which invoke a part in natural phenomenon, and in the circumstances of elements in order, which are worldly things, must be a part of the world, and thereof as an order of elemental forces or elements, as the world is defined as that imperfect thing created from perfect things called elements in order. 4 A law is something that causes circumstance in the world. 5 A law is certain elements in an order. 6 The world is divisable as has been show in 1. 7 The laws that it is created from, and not the elements it has nothing to do with, the orders of elements that may either be dividable or infinitely dividable, must conserve there effects amongst themselves if the world is to be dividable; such that any possible effect of a law is conserved as part of the effect of another possible law, such that if the world is figured without one law, another law causes it's effect in such a way as part of that effect entails the complete property of the other law. 8 Such that if Water is taken away, Ice insures it's effect as part of it's own, for if there is ice there can be water, and if Ice, then tundra, and tundra in the climate and in the air, and the air in that which people must breathe in order to live, so that if people must breathe then air must exist; such that when the triangle is taken away, the Quadrilateral contains as partial to it's whole the triangle, or as when the moment is taken away from time, a more recent moment entails that moment as partial to it's whole, such that the moment is defined as the non dividable unit of measure for dividable time, so is every part of nature a part of another part of nature. 9 Such that there exists a law wherein the possible effect of every other law is conserved as a partition of it's own effect, which is the effect of every possible effect of every possible law as a whole, which is beyond both the designations of elements and the world, as the world is any possible effects of any possibly ordered elements, and if the One Law is all possible effects of law in the world plus the effect of the effects of all the orders of the world as a whole, it is also beyond the scope of the elements in orders that define those laws which cause effects in the world, such that no order of elements can describe the One Law to the World who's effect is the order of all possible elements plus this effect as a whole beyond those orders and elements. 10 The One Transcendent Law is the complete nature of law. 11 the complete nature of law is an antecedence of elemental order, elements, and the world. 12 The complete nature of law functions beyond the capacities of elemental designations to contemplate, and therefor beyond that which the world can necessarily consist of. The Nature of Law will be called God (if) 13 God is that which creates the world outside the world, 15 The One creates the world, consciously or not, outside the world which is nominated as all those elements in order save the order which must conserve all the orders which the world is created from for the final order must conserve only as part of itself all other orders, for if the world is indeed all the orders of elements, and that when an element is ordered it joineth the world, the number of orders in the world must not approach infinity, because no thing can retain the infinite, for to be retained it is no longer the infinite but is a part of something more significant, such that it has yet be conserved, thereby the One order exists. 16 so that the one is God as were the world to be entirely dissasembled of all it's orders of elements, this law, that stood beyond that which the world could contemplate, should give to the world again, and make it again, such that it would have created the world. 1.The world as it is and not as how it is percieved in an object of experience is the entirety of ordered elements for the world cannot be individual elements and when an element comes into order it joineth the world as a part of the world and the world must be derived from something more pure then itself called an element or orders of elements that are either dividable or infinitely dividable, and in either circumstance eternal, perfect, or indestructable. 2.The world is dividable for elements are not, or may be divided eternally, and that which is impure cometh from that which is pure as Plotinus makes of, so that because the world is a final distribution of orders of elements each order of elements, or elements, either dividable or infinitely so, are more pure then the world, which they are finally concieved within. 3. If an order of elements is taken from the world the world is no longer the entirety of ordered elements, as the elements to produce the subtracted order still exist, and the elements thereby affecting that order continue as they always were, as elements are beyond worldly degeneration, for worldy degeneration is division into smaller portions, and therefor, the world does not fulfill the definition of the entirety of ordered elements if but a single order of elements is taken from the world [without a sort of compensation see 4]. 4.One order of elements must be conserved as a partition to another for if it was conserved entirely in another order, that order would be the order being subtracted from the world. 5.So every order is conserved as a part of another, thereby, the world mayst be figured without one of it's orders and produce the same effect as the world figured with all of it's orders. 6. SO the world satiates both it's nececessary requisities to defintion: dividability and that the world is the entirety of ordered elements. 7. One order conserves as part of itself the final order that the world is derived from which conserves in part all the other orders of the world. 8. So this order is necessarily a presupposition to the world as the world cannot be informed of an order of elements who in part contain the orders that the entire world is derived from. 9.The world is all the orders of elements except the transcendent order of elements that is ultimately conservative. 10. Orders of elements define the One Law and the World. 11. So the orders of elements may be ascribed to two inventions: a perfect one, the ultimately conservative order, and an imperfect one, the world, all the orders of elements except for the ultimately conservative order. 12. We call the transcendental order either God or Heaven. 1. The world is an inclusion of changes caused by parts as the invention of those parts for the world is a whole and can be divided, either philosophical, in the elements, or scientifically, in the configurations of atoms. 2. It is all the orders of elements; an element being either the non dividable or infinitely dividable part of the world, each element in the world being part of an order, and therein constituting an order of elements, whereof the world is an inclusion of all the changes caused by it's parts, as the invention of it's parts, which are all the elements in order. 3. The world is a final distribution of elements that are in order, rather they are not dividable or infinitely dividable, for the world cannot be factored except into the One, and therefor is 4. all the orders of elements except for the one 5. and so is at least dividable into smaller portions of itself, thereby being a final distribution of all of those parts; the parts themselves either being infinitely dividable or not dividable (if they are dividable then there is eventually an individable or infinitely dividable unit present within them) as it is that they must not exceed the world except in the One Order, as the world is all the orders of elements except for the one order because B. That which can be divided is either infinitely divided, being composed of parts that are infinitely divisable, or divided into elements, that cannot be divided, such that the world is either composed of infinitely dividable parts, that are pure, as the world cannot make up anything under it's definition as all those orders except the One Order, besides for all those orders except for the one order, such that it is impure, such that elements in orders exist as the infinitely dividable parts of the world or as the non dividable parts of the world, either way, attaining a certain perfection. Zeno is reconciled in that the world exists as a part of the One Law, as all the orders of elements, wherefor each must be conserved, which are a partition to the ultimately conservative order, exist in a state of perfection, as a part to the one order which conserves the whole of the orders of the world, or, conserves the final order of the world, as the world is the whole of orders of elements except for the One Order, as the world is not factored into anything besides the world, it is a final distribution who's parts must be elements in order that are either not divisable or infinitely divisable as if they were divisable they would be divided into either something that is infinitely divisable or that was not. 6. if the world is dividable, see 1, it is a whole, and is an inclusion of changes caused by parts of a whole, so that it must be dividable, that is, parts of it may be expunged, and it still must continue being the world which is all the orders of elements except for the one order because 7. elements( that are always in order) that are removed from the world still exist, so every order of elements, which are the parts of the world, must be conserved as a partition to another order of elements, such that the world may be Figured without one of it's parts, that is an order of elements, called dividing the world, and, due to the conservation of another order of elements, still entail all the possible orders of elements, so that it is both dividable and sustaining for 8. The world exists as a whole and must be dividable. 9. So that one order of elements exists that conserves all the other elements in the world, so it is always transcendent of the world, and conserves every order within the world within itself, such that this is the One Order: the One Order contains as a [part] of itself all the orders of the world. 10. The elements define both the Perfect world in the One Order and an imperfect world in all those orders of elements which are conserved as a partition to the One Order. A. The world is either an infinitely divisible continuity (the world can be taken into an infinte ammount of parts) or a derivation of non divisible elements and in either circumstances exists as the final distribution of it's parts. The World is made of elements, that are it's parts, for the world is a whole if it does not create something else, which it does not, and cannot be used to create other things, and that the world is able to be divided, such that the world is the finalization of whatever is the nature of the world, such that the world is not a part of something else, and is the finality of whatever it is, and every element in the world is perpetually existent, as the parts of a whole predate the whole, and every element of the world is in order with other elements, such that the world is made of elements, and if one is taken an order is taken, such that the world is created from orders of elements, as it is a whole, making up nothing, and thereof being made of something. 1. The world is a final distribution, or a whole, that cannot be used to concieve of anything else, for the world is the whole of elements, that are in order, asides for the elemental order that all other orders of elements are conserved by, every element constituting an order, for every element in the world exists in an order with other elements, and is conserved as part of another, as the creation of the elements, in order, and can not be used to concieve of anything greater then itself. 2. The world as all the orders except for the one order cannot be included in anything except for all the orders except for the one order. So it is a final distribution. The one order entails the world as a part of itself but it is transcendent of the world so the world cannot be used to create the One Order. 3. It is derived from either infinitely devidable elements or non dividable elements (see B) that are called element(s) in order(s) throughout this paper. 4. In either case the parts of the world, that are orders of elements, whereof every element consitutes an order with another, and every element always exists, must be conserved in other orders of elements, so that the world is always the entirety of the orders of elements except for the one order because it always exists as such and because it must be dividable. Logic Steps in the Preservation of Existence and Momentary Existence 1. The World is either Non divisible, or divisible into elements, or infinitely divisble. 2. If non divisible, it is non degenerating, and is Heaven, though it makes up nothing besides itself, so this is not likely. 3. If it is divisible into elements then it is created from elements in order. 4.If it is infinitely divisible it is created from parts that are infinitely divisible but, parts, non the less, that are called elements in orders. 5. Time is either Non divisible, divisible into elements, or infinitely divisible, or does not exist. 6. If it cannot be divided then moments, or parts of time, cannot degenerate, and so the past is as existent as the future. 7. If time is divisible into elements then a moment cannot be degenerated. 8. If time is divisible infinitely it is called a continuity and every moment of time can be stretched into eternity, and can never be completely destroyed, that is to say, divided into non existence. 9. If time does not exist all of creation is equally veritable rather or not it is in the past or the future for no division should exist between periods of the World's existence if those periods do not exist. 10.If the world lacketh in it's actual state either properties, or as a whole, those of shape, proportion, distance, distinction time, etc, all is one, such that any possible entity exists in another. 11. Time insureth that the world as an experiential object is indeed conserved in every indefatigable moment. PROPOSITIONAL CALCULUS L1= L A, O, Z, I (A) P, q (O) ^, ~ (Z) P^q~r (I) r P=If the [world is made of elements] q= and [order or circumstance is necessary amongst those elements to create the world] r=the world is all elemental orders. L2= L A, O, Z, I (A) P, q, w, s (O) ~,^ (Z) p~q^w~s (I) q,s p=if elements cannot be divided q= the world can w= the world is created from elements in order(madeof) s= elements in order from the world may be expunged. L3= L A, O, Z, I (A) r,t,m,n (O) ~,* (Z) r~t*m~n (I) t,n r=Taking an elemental order away from the world is illogical. t=it is illogical to take an elemental order from the world which is all the orders of the elements (unless) m= an elemental order is conserved as a partition to another n=so that the world is all elemental order even if an elemental order is from it expunged. (Save the the ultimately conservative order of elements, see above; conservation) 070927 ... unhinged approaching_infinity 200401 what's it to you? who go blather from